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As there continue to be incidents of attorneys slapping opposing counsel at depositions, attorneys
personally attacking each other during litigation (including in one case disparaging remarks about
an attorney’s alleged lack of parenting ability), and numerous other rude and disrespectful
behavior by attorneys, incivility remains a pervasive problem in the legal profession. 1 The
response thus far to incivility by the legal profession includes voluntary civility codes and calls
for professionalism. 2 These responses fail to address the systemic issue of incivility in the legal
profession. 3 As a result, several states added civility to their oaths of admission, while several
jurisdictions took the final step by making civility mandatory. 4
This article discusses how civility can be enforced, as well as the benefits of mandatory civility
and the purported disadvantages of mandatory civility. 5 This article concludes that state bars
should make civility mandatory and hold attorneys to a higher standard of conduct. 6 As the
former United States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor said, “More civility and
greater professionalism can only enhance the pleasure lawyers find in practice, increase the
effectiveness of our system of justice, and improve the public’s perception of lawyers.”7
Jurisdictions Currently Enforcing Civility
As stated above, a handful of jurisdictions – Arizona, Florida, Michigan, South Carolina, and the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas – have made civility mandatory. 8
Arizona, for example, mandates civility through an Arizona Supreme Court rule “that prohibits
‘substantial or repeated violations of the Oath of Admission to the Bar or the Lawyer’s Creed of
Professionalism’” 9, while Michigan mandates civility through two rules of professional conduct
referred to as its civility or courtesy rules, and South Carolina relies on its attorney oath, which is
discussed below in detail. 10
Other jurisdictions may recommend civility through civility codes, which provide suggested best
practices for attorneys, or non-mandatory civility oaths, such as New Mexico and Utah, but these
efforts fail to prevent the widespread epidemic of incivility that plagues the legal profession.11
As a result, mandatory civility should be employed by all state bars.12 The following are the
major requirements for enforcing civility. 13
Necessary Elements For Enforcing Civility
Sanctions
Enforcing civility requires that attorneys’ uncivil behavior can be punished or sanctioned.14 The
practice of law is a privilege, not a right, and state bars have the authority and power to regulate
attorney conduct, including incivility. 15 Without consequences for uncivil behavior, some in the
legal profession will be reluctant to change their behavior. 16
Each state bar could regulate civility in the same manner it regulates its ethics rules (i.e., its rules
of professional conduct). 17 State bars could add civility rules to their rules of professional
conduct, just as Michigan did, or state bars could incorporate civility rules through their attorney
oaths or other rules. 18 The civility rules should also be state specific based on the norms in each
state. 19 The disciplinary mechanisms already in place in each state that investigate, adjudicate
and impose sanctions based on violations of the rules of professional conduct for each state, could
also enforce civility. 20 In some cases, the sanction for incivility could be a private reprimand,
while in other cases suspension may be warranted. 21 Also, if an attorney committed uncivil acts
based on substance abuse problems or a death in the family, then the proper sanction might be
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court-ordered substance abuse programs or grief counseling, respectively. 22 Disbarment would
be an unlikely sanction.23
Rules
Civility in the legal profession is generally defined as “treating others-opposing counsel, the
court, clients, and others-with courtesy, dignity, and kindness.” 24 Civility for an attorney means
treating opposing counsel the way the attorney would want to be treated – i.e., the golden rule. 25
Enforcing civility requires more than a general definition. 26 It requires rules that give attorneys
notice of the behavior for which they may be sanctioned. 27
The following are ten rules for mandatory civility, along with comments (similar to what the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct use) to provide further guidance to the rules. 28 These
rules align with the core concepts revealed by a 2011 study on the approximately 140 civility
codes found across the nation. 29
1. I shall be courteous and civil, both in oral and in written
communication. 30
Comment: A lawyer shall avoid disparaging personal remarks or
acrimony toward opposing counsel, and should remain wholly
uninfluenced by any ill feeling between the respective clients. He/she
shall abstain from any allusion to personal peculiarities and
idiosyncrasies of opposing counsel. 31 Derogatory racial, gender, or
ethnic comments are unacceptable.32
2. I shall advise my clients that civility, courtesy, and fair dealing are
expected. 33
Comment: Civility, courtesy, and fair dealing are tools for effective
advocacy and not signs of weakness. Clients have no right to demand
that lawyers abuse anyone or engage in offensive or improper conduct.34
3. I shall, when practical, consult with opposing counsel before
scheduling hearings and depositions in a good faith attempt to avoid
scheduling conflicts. 35
Comment:
(1) When scheduling hearings and depositions, lawyers must
communicate with the opposing counsel in an attempt to schedule them
at a mutually agreeable time. This practice will avoid unnecessary
delays, expense to clients, and stress to lawyers and their secretaries in
the
management
of
the
calendars
and
practice.
(2) If a request is made to clear time for a hearing or deposition, the
lawyer to whom the request is made shall confirm that the time is
available or advise of a conflict within a reasonable time (preferably the
same business day, but in any event before the end of the following
business
day).
(3) Conflicts should be indicated only when they actually exist and the
requested time is not available. The courtesy requested by this guideline
shall not be used for the purpose of obtaining delay or any unfair
advantage.
(a)
Exceptions
to
General
Guidelines
(1) A lawyer who has attempted to comply with this rule is justified in
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setting a hearing or deposition without agreement from opposing counsel
if opposing counsel fails or refuses promptly to accept or reject a time
offered
for
hearing
or
deposition.
(2) If opposing counsel raises an unreasonable number of calendar
conflicts, a lawyer is justified in setting a hearing or deposition without
agreement
from
opposing
counsel.
(3) If opposing counsel has consistently failed to comply with this
guideline, a lawyer is justified in setting a hearing or deposition without
agreement
from
opposing
counsel.
(4) When an action involves so many lawyers that compliance with this
guideline appears to be impractical, a lawyer shall still make a good faith
attempt
to
comply
with
this
guideline.
(5) In cases involving extraordinary remedies where time associated with
scheduling agreements could cause damage or harm to a client’s case,
then a lawyer is justified in setting a hearing or deposition without
agreement from opposing counsel. 36
When hearings, depositions, meetings, or other events are to be canceled
or postponed, notify as early as possible other counsel, the court, or other
persons as appropriate, so as to avoid unnecessary inconvenience, wasted
time and expense, and to enable the court to use previously reserved time
for other matters. 37
4. I shall grant reasonable extensions of time to opposing counsel
where such extension will not have a material, adverse effect on the
rights of the client. 38
Comment:
(a) A lawyer shall readily grant any reasonable request for an extension
of time as an accommodation to opposing counsel who, because of a
busy trial schedule, personal emergency or heavy work load, needs
additional time to prepare a response or comply with a legal
requirement.
(b) No lawyer shall request an extension of time solely for the purpose of
delay
or
to
obtain
any
unfair
advantage.
(c) Counsel shall make every effort to honor previously scheduled
vacations of opposing counsel which dates have been established in good
faith. 39
5. I shall be punctual and prepared for all meetings, depositions, court
appearances, and, if unavoidably delayed, notify the court and counsel as
soon as possible. 40
6. I shall not utilize delay tactics.41
Comment: I shall readily stipulate to undisputed facts in order to avoid
needless costs or inconvenience for any party. 42
7. In depositions and other proceedings, and in negotiations, I shall
conduct myself with dignity, avoid making groundless objections, and
not be rude or disrespectful. 43
Comment: Never engage in conduct which would not be appropriate in
the presence of a judge. During a deposition, never obstruct the
interrogator or object to questions unless reasonably necessary to
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preserve an objection or privilege for resolution by the court. 44
“Speaking objections” during depositions designed to coach a witness
are impermissible. 45
8. I shall identify clearly, for other counsel or parties, all changes that I
have made in documents submitted to me for review. 46
9. I shall adhere to all express promises and agreements, whether oral
or written, and, in good faith, to all commitments implied by the
circumstances or local custom. 47
10.
I shall never encourage or knowingly authorize a person under my
direction or supervision to engage in conduct proscribed by these
principles. 48
Not only are rules necessary to enforce civility, but the following are also critical elements:
“(1) educating law students about civility and what it requires; (2) providing mandatory classes to
attorneys on civility, including what that jurisdiction requires; (3) educating judges about their
ability to sanction attorneys for uncivil conduct and what civility requires; and (4) consistent
enforcement of the civility rules by judges.” 49
Advantages of Mandatory Civility
Former United States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor summarized the benefits of
civility, stating, “More civility and greater professionalism can only enhance the pleasure lawyers
find in practice, increase the effectiveness of our system of justice, and improve the public’s
perception of lawyers.” 50
Courts and others have agreed. 51 “The dignity, decorum, and courtesy that have traditionally
characterized the courts and legal profession of civilized nations are not empty formalities. They
are essential to an atmosphere that promotes justice and to an attorney’s responsibility for the fair
and impartial administration of justice.”52 The Third Circuit asserted, “We do not approve of the
‘hardball’ tactics unfortunately used by some law firms today. The extension of normal
courtesies and exercise of civility expedite litigation and are of substantial benefit to the
administration of justice.” 53 Likewise, the Ninth Circuit stated, “Our adversarial system relies on
attorneys to treat each other with a high degree of civility and respect.”54
As a result, “civility is critical because it makes the administration of justice more efficient and it
increases the public’s confidence in the legal system, both of which are invaluable benefits to the
legal profession.” 55
Disadvantages of Mandatory Civility
The opponents of mandatory civility argue that the following are the major disadvantages of
requiring civility from attorneys: (1) enforcement of civility would be too subjective; (2)
mandatory civility would inhibit zealous advocacy; (3) civility rules inhibit First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights; and (4) civility would be too costly to enforce.56
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Subjectivity
One of the purported disadvantages of mandatory civility is enforcement would be difficult
because it would involve too much subjectivity. 57 A judge would have too much discretion when
ruling on incivility issues. 58 As an initial matter, in response to this argument, if states adopt
specific, straightforward civility rules, then judges should be able to enforce them. 59 Second,
judges must enforce rules in a consistent manner every day, and if the public or attorneys believe
that judges cannot enforce legal rules consistently and properly, then the entire judicial system
would be completely unreliable and ineffective.60 Third, rules of professional conduct are already
enforced, and subjectivity is involved with their enforcement. 61
For example, the professional rule of conduct for diligence, which is Rule 1.3 under the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”), provides, “Diligence: A lawyer shall act
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” 62 The application of this rule
requires subjectivity as the rule fails to provide how a court measures diligence or what precisely
reasonable promptness is. 63 Consider the following hypothetical:
If the client tells her lawyer that she wants a letter sent to opposing
counsel within the next two weeks regarding a deposition date for a third
party witness, and the attorney does not send it until four weeks later, has
there been a violation of reasonable promptness? Does it matter whether
the attorney was in trial when the client made the request to the attorney
to send the letter? Does it matter whether the client was not adversely
affected by the letter being sent out four weeks after the request?64
The result in this case, as in any case, would depend on the specific facts – a case-by-case
analysis – regardless of the broad language of the rule. 65
Simply because subjectivity may be necessary to rule on a civility issue, that does not mean
civility rules should be abandoned. 66 The rules of professional conduct require subjectivity for
enforcement, but no one would argue that those should be abandoned. 67 The rules of professional
conduct serve their purpose in protecting the legal profession, the legal system, and society, and
civility rules do the same. 68
Zealous Advocacy
Another purported disadvantage of mandatory civility is that requiring civility would inhibit
zealous advocacy. 69 The essence of the argument is that an attorney’s “ethical duties of
competency and zealous representation may compel lawyers to engage in behavior or to speak in
a manner others find disrespectful or uncivil.” 70 Also, zealous advocacy “may be inconsistent
with the obligation to cooperate and to forego certain advantages that may arise in the course of
litigation.” 71
The arguments regarding zealous advocacy fail for several reasons. One, zealous advocacy
should not be used as a shield for uncivil conduct because zealous advocacy and civility can and
should be compatible.72 For example, the Model Rules require zealous advocacy “while
maintaining a professional, courteous and civil attitude toward all persons involved in the legal
system.” 73 Comments to Model Rule 1.3, regarding diligence, state that the “lawyer’s duty to act
with reasonable diligence does not require the use of offensive tactics or preclude the treating of
all persons involved in the legal process with courtesy and respect.” 74
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Two, not only are civility and zealous advocacy compatible, but civility can enhance zealous
advocacy. 75 For example, attorneys oftentimes serve as the primary negotiators for their clients
during settlement negotiations. 76 If the attorneys are personally attacking each other, then it may
take more time to settle the case, and it will likely be more difficult to settle, which means higher
costs for the clients to pay for the additional time spent negotiating. 77 Also, a judge or jury may
find an attorney exhibiting uncivil behavior as less credible, which may negatively affect the
outcome of the client’s case. 78
Third, “[a] lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen
having special responsibility for the quality of justice.” 79 A lawyer’s various roles must guide
his/her behavior in conjunction with zealous advocacy, understanding that an efficient legal
system is undermined by uncivil conduct.80
Fourth, looking at the suggested mandatory rules in light of the zealous advocacy argument
demonstrates the ineptitude of the zealous advocacy argument. 81 For instance, suggested rule
number one states:
I will be courteous and civil, both in oral and in written
communication. 82
Comment: A lawyer should avoid disparaging personal remarks or
acrimony toward opposing counsel, and should remain wholly
uninfluenced by any ill feeling between the respective clients. He should
abstain from any allusion to personal peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of
opposing counsel. 83 Derogatory racial, gender, or ethnic comments are
unacceptable. 84
Personal attacks against opposing counsel, including attacks based on someone’s gender, race, or
ethnicity, are not necessary to advocate zealously on behalf of a client.85 In the South Carolina
case discussed below, the court held that zealous advocacy did not excuse a lawyer’s personal
attack on opposing counsel regarding opposing counsel’s daughter and the ability of opposing
counsel as a parent.86 Zealous advocacy can be aggressive, robust, adversarial, and civil.87
Suggested mandatory civility rule number five states, “I shall be punctual and prepared for all
meetings, depositions, court appearances, and, if unavoidably delayed, notify the court and
counsel as soon as possible.” 88
Zealous advocates are typically well-prepared and punctual.89 If an attorney is not fully prepared
to take a deposition, then the deposition may take longer to complete because the questioning
may not be as efficient as possible. 90 The longer the deposition takes, the higher costs will be for
all of the parties. 91 If a deposition starts late because of a tardy attorney, then the prompt
attorney’s client will also incur costs for the waiting time. 92 Thus, the civility rules promote,
rather than inhibit, zealous advocacy. 93
First and Fourteenth Amendments
Opponents of civility argue that another major disadvantage of mandatory civility would be that it
inhibits constitutionally protected rights, including free speech under the First Amendment
because mandatory civility is overbroad, and due process and fair notice under the Fourteenth
Amendment because it is vague. 94 As set forth above, however, if states adopt specific rules for
civility, then an attorney should know what speech is proper and what behavior constitutes
incivility. 95 In the case of In re Anonymous Member of S.C. Bar, the South Carolina Supreme
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Court addressed the issue of the infringement of constitutional rights with regard to mandatory
civility and held that South Carolina’s oath requiring civility is constitutional and does not violate
the First or Fourteenth Amendment. 96
The oath in South Carolina states, in pertinent part, “To opposing parties and their counsel, I
pledge fairness, integrity, and civility, not only in court, but also in all written and oral
In Anonymous, the attorney accused of uncivil behavior (the
communications…” 97
“Respondent”) represented the mother and opposing counsel represented the father in a
contentious domestic matter. 98 The Respondent sent opposing counsel the following email:
I have a client who is a drug dealer on ... Street down town [sic]. He
informed me that your daughter, [redacted] was detained for buying
cocaine and heroine [sic]. She is, or was, a teenager, right? This
happened at night in a known high crime/drug area, where alos [sic]
many shootings take place. Lucky for her and the two other teens, they
weren’t charged. Does this make you and [redacted] bad parents? This
incident is far worse than the allegations your client is making. I just
thought it was ironic. You claim that this case is so serious and
complicated. There is nothing more complicated and serious than having
a child grow up in a high class white family with parents who are highly
educated and financially successful and their child turning out buying
drugs from a crack head at night on or near ...Street. Think about it. Am
I right? 99
Opposing counsel’s daughter had nothing to do with the domestic dispute where Respondent and
opposing counsel represented adverse clients. 100 As a result, the wife of opposing counsel, who
was also an attorney, brought the civility complaint against Respondent. 101
The Respondent argued that the civility oath was unconstitutional. The South Carolina Supreme
Court held otherwise. With respect to the First Amendment, the South Carolina court cited the
United States Supreme Court, “Even outside the courtroom, [...] lawyers in pending cases [are]
subject to ethical restrictions on speech to which an ordinary citizen would not be.”102 In
accordance with the overbreadth doctrine, which seeks to prevent the chilling of constitutionally
protected speech, the court balanced the state’s interest in regulating the legal profession against a
lawyer’s First Amendment interest in the type of speech at issue. 103
The South Carolina Supreme Court stated that “[t]he interests protected by the civility oath are
the administration of justice and integrity of the lawyer-client relationship. The State has an
interest in ensuring a system of regulation that prohibits lawyers from attacking each other
personally in the manner in which Respondent attacked [opposing counsel].”104 The Court held
that attorneys attacking each other personally in the manner that Respondent did “compromises
the integrity of the judicial process” and “undermines a lawyer’s ability to objectively represent
his or her client.” 105 Thus, there was not any substantial amount of protected free speech
condemned in relation to the state’s interest concerning the regulation of the legal profession. 106
With regard to the Fourteenth Amendment argument concerning vagueness, and thus due process
and fair notice, the South Carolina Supreme Court applied the test of whether the law “forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that a person of common intelligence must
necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application.”107
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The South Carolina Supreme Court determined that “even a casual reading of the attorney’s oath
would put a person on notice that the type of language used in Respondent's ‘Drug Dealer’ e-mail
violates the civility clause.” 108 In particular, “Casting aspersions on an opposing counsel’s
offspring and questioning the manner in which an opposing attorney was rearing his or her own
children does not even near the margins of the civility clause.”109 Also, a person of common
intelligence could understand the meaning of the South Carolina civility oath.110 Thus, the
Supreme Court held that the civility oath did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.111
The suggested mandatory civility rules in this article provide, just as South Carolina’s civility
oath does, fair notice of what is required by attorneys, and the suggested civility rules do not chill
the use of protected free speech.112
Costly to Enforce
Another purported disadvantage of mandatory civility is that it would be too costly to enforce. 113
Provided state bars enforce civility just as they do the rules of professional conduct, then the costs
of enforcing civility may not rise at all.114 For instance, if someone makes a complaint about an
attorney that includes a lack of diligence and incivility, then that complaint would likely be just as
costly before mandatory civility rules existed because the diligence complaint would need to be
investigated anyway. 115 Also, even if complaints solely regarding incivility arose, then
enforcement costs might rise initially, but once civility started to permeate the culture of the legal
profession, then there would likely be less incivility and less incivility complaints, particularly if
state bars properly sanctioned uncivil behavior, deterring others.116
Another disadvantage regarding the cost of mandatory civility, opponents may argue, would
include some attorneys making baseless civility complaints against opposing counsel to harass
opposing counsel. 117 This argument fails as well. If state bars handle frivolous civility
complaints in the same manner they handle frivolous ethical complaints, then the baseless civility
complaint would be swiftly dismissed.118 Also, the threat of using rules to harass opposing
counsel already exists with ethical complaints, but potential misuse of ethical rules do not warrant
the removal of ethical rules – this reasoning similarly applies to civility rules. 119 Finally, if
mandatory civility rules are successful in changing the culture of the legal profession, then fewer
frivolous civility complaints (if they are filed in the first place) will be filed as time passes.120
Causes of Incivility
If the legal profession truly wants to dispel incivility, then it must also try to determine the root
causes of incivility. 121 The following are some of the major potential causes that should be
studied to determine their relationship, if any, with uncivil behavior: the increase in the size of
the bar – i.e., the number of attorneys – and whether that, in turn, increases incivility; poor or
nonexistent education in law school on civility; clients who request or desire uncivil behavior
from their attorneys; “‘individual lawyers’ poor moral character;’ and the ‘decline of face-to-face
interactions among lawyers’ due to the increase of interaction via technology, such as email.” 122
Conclusion
The benefits of mandatory civility, which include a more efficient legal system, better public
perception of attorneys, and a more enjoyable practice for attorneys, outweigh any purported
disadvantages, such as the alleged preclusion of zealous advocacy or constitutional rights, and the
unsubstantiated difficulty with, and costs to, enforce civility. 123 All state bars should follow the
lead of the several jurisdictions that require civility from its attorneys. 124 The legal system, the
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public, and attorneys themselves should demand today that all lawyers be held to a higher
standard of conduct, just as they are in those few jurisdictions that have adopted mandatory
civility. 125
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